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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
For the recorded recollection exception under U.R.E. 803(5) to apply, it must be
shown that the writing was made when the matter was "fresh" in the witness' memory.
While some courts require the writing to be made at or near the time the recorded events
occurred, and others are not quite so restrictive, no court has applied the recorded
recollection exception where the writing was made more than three years after the events
took place. Where Mr. Christenson's Affidavit was prepared fourteen years after the
1985 Deed to Zions described therein was executed, it was not prepared when the
recorded events were fresh in his memory as a matter of law. Mr. Christenson's
conclusory statement to the contrary does not produce a different result. The trial court
erred in allowing the Affidavit to be read into evidence under the recorded recollection
exception.
The Michels' attorney timely objected at trial to the reading of the Affidavit under
Rule 803(5) on the ground that the Affidavit was not made when the recorded events
were fresh in Mr. Christenson's memory. That objection was not waived simply because
the decision was not restated a second time.
Mr. Christenson's testimony that it was not his habit to sign a document as trustee
if he was not acting on behalf of a trust does not mean that he did not do so on occasion,
and constitutes insufficient evidence to render the trial court's ruling not clearly
erroneous. Such testimony provides no credible evidence regarding his intent when he
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signed the 1985 Deed to Zions with the word "Trustee" after his signature, and does not
rebut the presumption of descripto personae in this case.
The overwhelming evidence established that Mr. Christenson did not intend to
convey to Zions only his interest in the Property as trustee of the Cape Trust. Mr.
Christenson purchased the Property at tax sale to protect Zions' interest in the Property.
When Zions repaid Mr. Christenson for the amount he paid to purchase the Property, he
reconveyed the Property to Zions. Mr. Christenson held no interest in the Property as
trustee of the Cape Trust at the time the 1985 Deed to Zions was signed. After the deed
was recorded, the County Recorder showed the title to the Property to be vested in Zions,
not Mr. Christenson. One year later, Mr. Christenson's company purchased the Property
from Zions, took out a loan to do so, and gave Zions a trust deed to the Property to secure
the loan. Mr. Christenson did not list the Property as an asset on his 1987 Financial
Statement. When his company defaulted on its loan to Zions, the Property was sold to the
Michels at foreclosure sale. In the SLC Lawsuit filed in 1996, Mr. Christenson did not
claim to be the owner of the Property; and the district court in the SLC Lawsuit ultimately
held that Mr. Christenson had no right, title or interest in the Property. In view of the
foregoing evidence, the trial court's ruling in this action was against the clear weight of
the evidence and was clearly erroneous.
The Affidavit consisted of unsubstantiated opinions, conclusions or beliefs, lacked
evidentiary foundation, and failed to state admissible facts. Had it been submitted with
TWN's motion for summary judgment prior to the first appeal, TWN would not have
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been entitled to summary judgment. A genuine issue would have remained regarding
Mr. Christenson's intent in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions with the word "Trustee" after
his signature.
The Court is warranted in considering the Michels' claim preclusion defense
because that defense, which arose after the entry of the summary judgment that was the
subject of the earlier appeal, was specifically raised in the Michels5 docketing statement,
and the decision in the SLC Lawsuit was noted and discussed in their brief, in the first
appeal. The Court also may consider the claim preclusion defense to prevent manifest
injustice.
Under the general rule, TWN is in privity with Mr. Christenson under the claim
preclusion doctrine because Mr. Christenson transferred any interest he had in the
Property to TWN while the SLC Lawsuit was pending. The exceptions to the general rule
found in § 44 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments have not been adopted in Utah,
and therefore do not apply. Even if those exceptions were recognized in Utah, TWN still
would be in privity with Mr. Christenson, and bound by the rules of res judicata, where
TWN did not present evidence establishing the applicability of the exceptions.
Where Mr. Christenson's claim in the SLC Lawsuit and TWN's claim in this
action both sought a determination of the parties' respective right, title and interest in the
Property, TWN's claim could have and should have been asserted in the SLC Lawsuit.
Because that claim was not raised in that action, TWN, as successor-in-interest to Mr.
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Christenson, is barred under the claim preclusion doctrine from asserting the claim in this
action.
For the reasons set forth in Section IV of the Michels' initial brief, the Court
should determine that the Michels' invalid tax sale defense has not been waived and
should consider it on appeal, rule that this defense is not barred by the statute of
limitations, declare that the 1984 Tax Sale is invalid and that the Tax Deed is void ab
initio, and reverse the Judgment on the ground that neither Mr. Christenson nor TWN
ever acquired a valid interest in the Property.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED
BECAUSE TWN FAILED TO PRESENT ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION OF DESCRIPTIO PERSONAE
A.

The Affidavit Was Not Prepared When The Matters Referred To Therein
Were "Fresh" In Mr. Christenson's Memory, Notwithstanding His
Conclusory Statement To The Contrary.
TWN argues in its brief that the "foundational question [in determining whether a

writing may be read into evidence under Rule 803(5) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
["Rule 803(5)"] is not the lapse of time between the events recorded in the writing and
the writing's creation, but whether, at the time the writing was created, the substance
thereof was clear in the witness's memory." [TWN Brief at 24.] That statement is
inaccurate.
Rule 803(5), as well as the case law interpreting the recorded recollection
exception under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5), requires that the writing be made when
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the matter is "fresh" in the witness' memory, not simply when it is "clear" in the witness'
memory, as TWN contends. U.R.E. 803(5).! Requiring the matter to be "fresh" in the
witness' memory helps to insure the trustworthiness of the writing. See U.S. v. FMC
Corp., 306 F.Supp. 1106, 1137 (E.D.Pa. 1969). TWN's interpretation of Rule 803(5) so
as to eliminate the requirement that the writing be made when the matter is "fresh" in the
witness' memory is not supported by the case law and cannot be sustained.
TWN argues that even though Mr. Christenson's Affidavit was prepared fourteen
years after the 1985 Deed to Zions was executed, his intention in signing the deed still
was "fresh" in his memory within the meaning of the recorded recollection exception
because the modern rule does not require that the recorded recollection be "made at or
near the time of the events recorded," but rather considers the question on a case-by-case
basis. While some courts no longer require the recorded recollection to be "made at or
near the time of the events recorded," TWN has presented no court decision or other legal
authority suggesting that the recorded recollection exception will apply where the writing
was made fourteen years after the events referred to therein occurred.
In U.S. v. Senak, 527 F.2d 129, 141-42 (7th Cir. 1976), the court sustained the
reading into evidence of a writing that was made three years after the events referred to
therein took place. The Michels are not aware of any other reported decision that has
permitted a record made more than three years after the recorded events occurred to be
read into evidence under the recorded recollection exception. To the contrary, courts
]

Utah Rule of Evidence 803(5) is identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(5).
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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have refused to treat records as being made when "fresh" in the witness' memory where
the records were made more than three years after the events took place. See Cathey v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 776 F.2d 1565, 1582-83 (6th Cir. 1985) (where events
occurred "several years prior to preparing the l i s t . . . the freshness requirement of Rule
803(5) would not seem to be met"); U.S. v. FMC Corp., 306 F.Supp. 1106, 1136-38 (E.D.
Pa. 1969) (events occurring four to eight years before recorded statement was made were
too remote). Based upon the applicable case law, an event cannot be considered "fresh"
in a person's memory fourteen years after the event occurred.
In attempting to justify the trial court's action in allowing the Affidavit to be read
into evidence under the recorded recollection exception, TWN relies upon the conclusory
statement made by Mr. Christenson at trial that the contents of the Affidavit were fresh in
his recollection at the time he signed the Affidavit.2 Where fourteen years had elapsed
between the signing of the 1985 Deed to Zions and the signing of the Affidavit, the
Affidavit was not signed when the events described therein were "fresh" in Mr.
Christenson's memory as a matter of law, notwithstanding Mr. Christenson's conclusory
testimony to the contrary.
TWN erroneously argues that the Michels seek to impose new legal standards
restricting the trial court's discretion in admitting the content of the Affidavit under Rule
803(5). To the contrary, the Michels simply object to the trial court allowing the
2

Mr. Christenson merely adopted the conclusory statement contained in the question
posed to him by TWN's counsel, as follows: "Q. 'At the time you signed that [affidavit],
were the contents of the affidavit fresh in your recollection?' A. 'Yes.'" [R. 1379 at 20.]
-6-
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Affidavit to be read into evidence when it was not prepared when the matters referred to
therein were fresh in the witness' memory, as Rule 803(5) requires. Given that the
Affidavit was prepared fourteen years after the 1985 Deed to Zions was executed by Mr.
Christenson, long after that event was fresh in Mr. Christenson's memory, the trial court
committed reversible error in allowing that Affidavit to be read into evidence at trial.
B.

The Michels' Attorney Timely Objected To TWN's Request That Mr,
Christenson Be Permitted To Read The Affidavit Into Evidence.
TWN argues that the Michels' attorney only objected to the reading of the

Affidavit on the basis that the Affidavit was not being used to refresh the witness'
recollection.3 That argument is factually incorrect and without merit.
TWN's attorney asked the trial court for permission for Mr. Christenson to read
the Affidavit into evidence pursuant to the recorded recollection exception set forth in
Rule 803(5). [R. 1379 at 18.] The Michels' attorney objected, arguing that, under Rule
803(5), TWN had to show that the Affidavit "was made or adopted by the witness when
the matter was fresh in the witness' memory," and that the Affidavit "certainly wasn't
made at or about the time it was fresh in his mind." [R. 1379 at 18.] Following further
discussion between the trial court and counsel and voir dire of the witness, TWN renewed
its request that the witness be allowed to read the entire Affidavit into evidence, which
the trial court granted. [R. at 19-25.]

3

Contrary to TWN's assertion, the Michels do not claim that the recorded recollection
exception did not apply because the Affidavit did not refresh Mr. Christenson's present
recollection regarding his intent when he signed the 1985 Deed to Zions.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law-7Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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TWN states that after the trial court initially sustained the Michels' attorney's
objection to the reading of the Affidavit, TWN's counsel "backed up and tried again,"
eliciting from the witness "foundational testimony which directly tracked the
requirements of Rule 803(5)." [TWN's Brief at 25.] TWN argues that because the
Michels' attorney did not renew his objection a second time, but merely conducted voir
dire of the witness on the issue of whether the Affidavit refreshed the witness'
recollection of the events contained therein, the objection was waived.
TWN's argument ignores the fact that the basis for the Michels' attorney's
objection to the witness being permitted to read into the record the contents of the
Affidavit - that the Affidavit had not been made when the events set forth therein were
fresh in the witness' memory - was not an objection based on lack of foundation that
could be cured by eliciting additional foundational testimony. The objection was that,
because the Affidavit was made fourteen years after the events described therein
occurred, the Affidavit was not made when the events were fresh in the witness' memory.
TWN's counsel could not and did not overcome the objection to the reading of the
Affidavit into evidence by eliciting additional testimony from the witness. Mr.
Christenson's subsequent testimony did not change the fact that the Affidavit still was
prepared fourteen years after the events described therein had occurred, thereby making
the reading of the Affidavit improper under Rule 803(5). The Michels' attorney had
objected to the reading of the Affidavit on the ground that the Affidavit had not been
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prepared when the recorded events were fresh in the witness' memory, and that objection
was not waived simply because it was not repeated a second time.
C.

The Trial Court's Ruling That Mr, Christenson Signed The 1985 Deed To
Zions Only As Trustee Of The Cape Trust Is Contrary To The Clear Weight
Of The Evidence And Is Clearly Erroneous.
TWN asserts that Mr. Christenson testified "that, as a matter of business practice,

he would not have executed a Quitclaim Deed with the word 'Trustee' after his name, if
he intended to convey his individual interest" and argues that such testimony "was
sufficient, standing alone, to render the trial court's ruling not 'clearly erroneous,' and
subject to attack." [TWN Brief at 30-31.] TWN is wrong on both counts.
The testimony of Mr. Christenson relied upon by TWN was as follows:
Q.

(by Mr. Rampton) Do you make it a habit as your business activity
to sign a document stating that your signature is on behalf of- is as
trustee if you're not acting on behalf of the trust?

A.

No. We try to be very specific as to what trust I'm conveying
(inaudible) signing it.

Q.

Would it be unusual for you to try to convey an individual interest on
a document that says "Trustee" on it?

A.

You wouldn't put "Trustee" in it if you were signing (inaudible).

[R. 1379 at 39.]
Mr. Christenson's vague, imprecise and, to some extent, non-responsive answers
to TWN's counsel's leading questions on this subject do not constitute sufficient evidence
to render the trial court's ruling not clearly erroneous, as TWN suggests. Even if Mr.
Christenson did not "make it a habit" to sign a document with the word "trustee" after his

-9-
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name if he was not acting on behalf of a trust, that does not mean that he never did so.
Even if such an occurrence were unusual, it still may have happened on occasion.
Mr. Christenson's testimony did not provide any credible evidence regarding his
intent when signing the 1985 Deed to Zions with the word "Trustee" after his signature.
Mr. Christenson was unable to recall why the word "Trustee" was next to his signature on
that deed. He was unable to testify whether the word "trustee" was on the deed for a
purpose, for no purpose, or as a result of a mistake. He presented no testimony or any
other evidence regarding his intent in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions that would rebut the
presumption of descriptio personae.
This is particularly true given the overwhelming evidence establishing that Mr.
Christenson did not intend to convey to Zions only his interest in the Property as trustee
of the Cape Trust. The evidence presented at trial established:
1.

Mr. Christenson, as a customer of Zions, purchased the Property at the Tax

Sale in order to protect Zions' interest in the Property. [R. 1380 at 8-9.]
2.

Zions reimbursed Mr. Christenson for the full amount that he had paid to

purchase the Property at the Tax Sale, whereupon Mr. Christenson conveyed the Property
to Zions by executing the 1985 Deed to Zions. [R. at 1380 at 10-12.]
3.

There is no evidence that Mr. Christenson held any interest in the Property

as trustee of the Cape Trust at the time the 1985 Deed to Zions was signed.
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4.

After the 1985 Deed to Zions was recorded, the Utah County Recorder's

office showed that title to the property was vested in Zions, not Mr. Christenson. [R.
1380 at 91; Ex. 12 at U 7.]
5.

One year later, Mr. Christenson caused his company, Franklin, to purchase

the Property from Zions for a large sum of money, and took out a loan from Zions to do
so. [R. 1380 at 16, 20-21.]
6.

After Franklin purchased the Property from Zions, Mr. Christenson signed a

Trust Deed to the Property on behalf of Franklin, pledging the Property to secure the loan,
thereby acknowledging that Franklin was the owner of the Property. [Ex. 6; R. 1380 at
20-21.]
7.

Mr. Christenson did not list the Property as an asset owned by him on his

1987 Financial Statement. [Ex. 10.]
8.

When Mr. Christenson5s company failed to make payment on the loan to

Zions, the Property was sold to the Michels at foreclosure sale. [R. 1380 at 22.]
9.

In 1996, Mr. Christenson filed the SLC Lawsuit against the Michels and

others to foreclose what he claimed was a beneficial interest in a contract right in the
Property. [Ex. 8 at 22.] He did not claim that he was the owner of the Property at that
time. The court in the SLC Lawsuit ultimately held that Mr. Christenson had no right,
title or interest in the Property. [Ex. 9 at 4, % 1.]
The overwhelming evidence establishes that Mr. Christenson, in signing the 1985
Deed to Zions, understood that he was conveying his entire interest in the Property, and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

did not intend to convey to Zions only his interest in the Property as trustee for Cape
Tmst. The trial court's decision was contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, and was
clearly erroneous, and therefore the Judgment in favor of TWN should be reversed.
D.

Had TWN Submitted The Affidavit With Its Summary Judgment Motion
Prior To The First Appeal The Affidavit Would Not Have Entitled TWN to
Summary Judgment.
TWN argues that if it had submitted Mr. Christenson's Affidavit to the trial court

in support of its motion for summary judgment, the trial court's grant of summary
judgment would have been sustained on appeal, and there would have been no trial on
remand. In making this argument, TWN relies upon this Court's statement in TWN I that
the Supreme Court in Boise Cascade Corp. v. Stonewood Development Corp., 655 P.2d
668, 669 (Utah 1982), was "suggesting that a counter-affidavit could have rebutted the
presumption of descriptio personae and shown that the descriptive language was intended
to bind the person in his representative capacity rather than in his individual capacity."
[TWNI at f 14.] Based upon this language, TWN asserts that the Affidavit would have
constituted the needed evidence to establish that the inclusion of the word "trustee" on the
1985 Deed to Zions reflected Mr. Christenson's intention to convey to Zions only his
interest in the Property as trustee for the Cape Trust, and not his personal interest in the
Property. That argument is without merit.
First of all, the Affidavit was not submitted with the summary judgment motion,
and TWN's speculation as to what might have resulted had the Affidavit been filed with
the motion does not support the judgment entered following the trial on remand.
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Moreover, TWN's argument ignores the fact that an affidavit supporting or
opposing a motion for summary judgment must be made on personal knowledge, must set
forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and must affirmatively show that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. See U.R.C.P. 56(e). An
affidavit that reflects merely the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions, conclusions or beliefs,
lacks evidentiary foundation, or fails to state admissible facts must be stricken. See
Luckett v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 618 F.2d 1373, 1380 n. 7 (10th Cir. 1980). Mr.
Christenson's Affidavit contains only a conclusory and self-serving statement that he
intended to sign the 1985 Deed to Zions in his capacity as trustee of Cape Trust. The
Affidavit fails to provide any evidentiary foundation or other admissible facts to support
that statement.
Had the Affidavit been submitted at trial, the Michels would have presented the
evidence outlined above that establishes that Mr. Christenson understood that he was
conveying to Zions his individual interest in the Property, and did not intend to convey
only his interest in the Property as trustee for Cape Trust. Such evidence refuting the
assertions in the Affidavit would have created a genuine issue of material fact regarding
Mr. Christenson's intent in signing the 1985 Deed to Zions with the word "trustee"
following his signature, thereby precluding the granting of summary judgment.4
4

Based upon the conclusory nature of the Affidavit, and the overwhelming evidence
refuting the statement in the Affidavit regarding Mr. Christenson's intent in signing the
1985 Deed to Zions, the Court also is justified in summarily rejecting TWN's suggestion
that this Court now should rule that the Affidavit cures the deficiency in the record before
it in 2003, and should sustain the trial court's earlier grant of summary judgment.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

II. THIS COURT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM ADDRESSING
THE MICHELS' RES JUDICATA DEFENSE ON APPEAL,
AND SHOULD RULE THAT TWN'S CLAIM IS BARRED
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF CLAIM PRECLUSION
A.

The Michels Preserved Their Claim Preclusion Defense In The First Appeal.
The Michels raised their claim preclusion defense promptly after the district

court's Summary Judgment Order in the SLC Lawsuit was entered, as part of their motion
for reconsideration of the trial court's decision granting TWN's motion for summary
judgment. The parties briefed the issue, but the trial court, in denying the motion for
reconsideration, did not address the claim preclusion defense. Since the trial court did not
specifically address or rule on the claim preclusion defense prior to the first appeal, the
trial court was not precluded from considering the issue on remand pursuant to the "law
of the case" doctrine. See generally Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Center, Inc.,
2003 UT 23, % 25, 70 P.3d 904, 912.
While the Michels did not expressly identify the claim preclusion defense as a
specific issue to be decided in the first appeal, they certainly raised the issue as part of
their appeal. The Michels notified the Court in their docketing statement of the decision
in the SLC Lawsuit, and that the Michels had argued to the trial court that some or all of
the issues in the case were barred by res judicata. [R. 1162 at 7.] The decision in the
SLC Lawsuit also was noted in the Michels' brief in the first appeal, and a copy of that
decision was attached thereto. [See Addendum F to the Michels' Initial Brief at 8, f 28,
19 n.10, Addendum E thereto.]
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This Court did not address the claim preclusion defense in TWN I, but may do so
now in this appeal to prevent manifest injustice. See Sussman v. Patterson, 108 F.3d
1206, 1210 (10th Cir. 1997). The trial court's ruling that TWN, as the successor to Mr.
Christenson, is the rightful owner of the Property is inconsistent with the district court's
decision in the SLC Lawsuit that Mr. Christenson had no right, title or interest in the
Property. Where this issue was not decided in the trial court prior to the first appeal, was
not decided in TWN I, and was not decided by the trial court on remand, and has been
raised and briefed by the parties, the Court is warranted in considering and ruling on the
claim preclusion defense.
B.

TWN Is In Privity With Mr, Christenson For Purposes Of Res Judicata,
TWN argues that the Michels' claim preclusion defense does not bar TWN's

action against the Michels because TWN was not in privity with Mr. Christenson for
claim preclusion purposes. Although it is undisputed that TWN acquired its claimed
interest in the Property from Mr. Christenson [see Ex. 3], TWN asserts that there is no
privity for claim preclusion purposes because it acquired the Property from Mr.
Christenson before the judgment in the SLC Lawsuit was entered, TWN was not made a
party to the SLC Lawsuit, and a lis pendens was not filed in the SLC Lawsuit. [TWN
Brief at 33-34.] TWN's reliance on those facts in support of its argument on the privity
issue is misplaced.
In support of its position, TWN summarizes generally the commentary in Moore's
Federal Practice ["Moore"] regarding the circumstances in which a successor-in-interest
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to property may be in privity with the transferor. [TWN's Brief at 33-34.] TWN's
reliance on that language in Moore also is misplaced.
Moore specifically provides in relevant part as follows:
A transferee of property following a judgment affecting that property
[which was the subject of the litigation] may benefit from and is subject to
application of claim preclusion to the same extent as the transferor of the
property would be. . . . Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, the rights
"conveyed" to the prevailing party would include the entire claim relating to
those interests, so a successor in interest could not relitigate such interests
by utilizing a different legal theory or seeking different relief.
18 Moore's Federal Practice (3d Ed.) at § 131.40[3][b][i], pp. 131-138, 131-139.
With respect to transfers of property made while litigation is pending, Moore
states:
If the property is the subject of a pending action at the time of
transfer, the result is the same as a transfer following judgment, unless
statutes requiring notice of pending actions relating to certain property have
not been complied with or the opposing party is aware of the transfer and
knows that the successor in interest is unaware of the pending action.
18 Moore's Fed. Prac. (3dEd.)at§ 131.40[3][b][ii],p. 131-139, citing Golden State
Bottling Co., Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 414 U.S. 168 (1973) ("Persons acquiring an interest in
property that is a subject of litigation are bound by, or entitled to the benefit of, a
subsequent judgment, despite a lack of knowledge"), and Restatement (Second) of
Judgments §44 (1982).
Moore's statements regarding the impact of the claim preclusion doctrine on a
successor-in-interest to whom property was transferred during the pendency of an action
involving the transferor is based upon the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44
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(1982), although Moore's summary of that section is incomplete. Section 44 of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments states in pertinent part as follows:
A successor in interest of property that is the subject of a pending
action to which his transferor is a party is bound by and entitled to the
benefits of the rules of res judicata to the same extent as his transferor,
unless:
(1)
A procedure exists for notifying potential successors in
interest of pending actions concerning property, the procedure was not
followed, and the successor did not otherwise have knowledge of the
action; or
(2)
The opposing party in the action knew of the transfer to the
successor and knew also that the successor was unaware of the pending
action.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 44 (1982) (emphasis added).
Under this section of the Restatement, as recognized in Moore, the general rule is
that the transferee of property that is the subject of a pending action in which the
transferor is a party is bound by the rules of res judicata to the same extent as the
transferor. Accordingly, TWN, as the successor-in-interest of Mr. Christenson in the
Property, is in privity with him, and is bound by the rules of res judicata.
TWN argues that it is not in privity with Mr. Christenson for claim preclusion
purposes, and is not bound by the rules of res judicata, because of the two exceptions to
the general rule contained in § 44 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. However,
this Court has specifically refused to adopt these exceptions to the general rule. In Kunz
& Co. v. State, 913 P.2d 765, 769 (Utah App. 1996), this Court stated:
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Kunz proposes that we adopt the test set forth in the Second
Restatement of Judgments, which provides various exceptions to the
applicability of res judicata to a successor of a property interest when that
property is the subject of a pending litigation to which the transferor of the
interest, rather than the successor, is a party. See Restatement (Second) of
Judgments § 44 (1982). Utah has not adopted the Restatement test, and we
decline to do so now. [Emphasis added.]
Mr. Christenson filed the SLC Lawsuit in 1996 to foreclose a claimed interest in
the Property. [R. 1380 at 23; Ex. 8 at 2, f 3.] In 1998, while the SLC Lawsuit was
pending, Mr. Christenson transferred whatever interest he had in the Property to TWN by
quit-claim deed. [Ex. 3.] In 2000, the district court in the SLC Lawsuit entered its
Summary Judgment Order, ruling that Mr. Christenson had no right, title or interest in the
Property. [Ex. 9 at 4, f 1.] Where TWN acquired the Property from Mr. Christenson
during the pendency of the SLC Lawsuit, and where the exceptions set forth in § 44 of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments do not apply, TWN is in privity with Mr. Christenson
under the claim preclusion doctrine.
Even if the exceptions contained in § 44 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
applied in Utah, TWN still would be in privity with Mr. Christenson and bound by the
rules of res judicata because TWN did not present evidence establishing that those
exceptions apply in this case. TWN did not prove that it was without knowledge of the
pendency of the SLC Lawsuit at the time Mr. Christenson conveyed his interest in the
Property to TWN in 1998, thereby rendering exception (1) inapplicable, or that the
Michels knew that TWN was unaware of the SLC Lawsuit, thereby precluding the
application of exception (2).
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C.

TWN's Claim Of Ownership Of The Property Could Have And Should Have
Been Presented In The SLC Lawsuit And Therefore TWN's Claim In This
Action Is Barred By Res Judicata.
In the SLC Lawsuit, Mr. Christenson alleged that his interest in the Property was

superior to that of the Michels and all other defendants, and he sought to foreclose their
interests in the Property. In this action, TWN claims that it is the owner of the Property,
which it obtained from Mr. Christenson, and that the Michels have no interest in the
Property. Where both claims seek a determination of the parties' respective right, title
and interest in the Property, the claim being asserted by TWN in this action could have
and should have been asserted by Mr. Christenson in the SLC Lawsuit. Where Mr.
Christenson failed to do so, TWN, the successor-in-interest to Mr. Christenson, is barred
under the claim preclusion doctrine from asserting its claim in this action.
III. FOR THE REASONS SET FORTH IN SECTION IV OF THE MICHELS
INITIAL BRIEF, THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE
MICHELS' TAX SALE DEFENSE, RULE THAT IT IS NOT
BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, DECLARE THE
SALE INVALID AND THE TAX DEED VOID AB INITIO, AND
REVERSE THE JUDGMENT ON THE GROUND THAT NEITHER
MR. CHRISTENSON NOR TWN EVER ACQUIRED
A VALID INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY
In their initial brief, the Michels presented the facts and law supporting their
position that they did not waive their right to challenge the validity of the 1984 Tax Sale,
that this issue was not disposed of by this Court in the first appeal, that the tax sale
defense is not barred by the statute of limitations, and that the Court is warranted in
declaring the Tax Sale invalid and the Tax Deed void ab initio. The points raised in the
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Michels' initial brief fully address the arguments made by TWN in its brief on appeal, and
therefore no reply to those arguments is necessary.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in Section IV of the Michels' initial brief,
the Court should consider their tax sale defense on appeal, rule that this defense is not
barred by the statute of limitations, declare the Tax Sale is invalid and the Tax Deed is
void ab initio, and reverse the Judgment entered by the trial court on the ground that
neither Mr. Christenson nor TWN ever acquired any valid interest in the Property.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in this Reply Brief and in the Michels' initial Brief, the
Michels respectfully request that the Court reverse the Judgment entered by the trial court,
and enter judgment in favor of the Michels, quieting title to the Property in them.
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2005.
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